You have probably noticed that
the number and frequency of
Temporary Flight Restrictions
(TFRs) affecting model aircraft have
increased in the past several weeks. This
is not surprising
and unfortunately,
the occurrence of
TFRs is likely to
increase as we get
into the heart of the
2012 presidential
campaign.
Following
Mitt Romney’s
apparent clinching
of the Republican
nomination, Barak
Obama’s campaign
has shifted into high
gear and VIP TFRs
are increasing as he
travels across the
country.
Since January
2009, restrictions
on model aircraft
operations have been included as part of
the security measures imposed whenever
the president travels within the US.
They also come into play during highprofi
le events such as the recent 25th
NATO Summit held in Chicago, the
G-8 Summit Meeting at Camp David in
Maryland, and Super Bowl XLVI held in
Indianapolis.
We will also see similar TFRs for the
Republican
National
Convention
in Tampa,
Florida,
in August
and the
Democratic
National
Convention
in Charlotte,
North
Carolina, in
September.
Many
have asked
why radiocontrolled
model aircraft
operations
are included
in the
restrictions and prohibited while a VIP
TFR is in effect. Is it because model
airplanes are viewed as posing a threat to
our national security and the welfare of
our heads of state?
Certainly AMA doesn’t believe this,
and I don’t believe the FAA or the
Secret Service believes this, nor do any
of the many other federal, state, and
local agencies involved in developing and
implementing these security measures.
However, the recent advancements in
unmanned aircraft technology and the
advent of unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS) operations have signifi cantly
clouded the issue.
Many UAS platforms appear similar
to what we otherwise think of as model
aircraft and, without going into a lot of
detail, it’s easy to imagine an unmanned
aircraft designed to be harmful,
disruptive, or even lethal.
In a security zone, those monitoring
the airspace must be able to tell
friend from foe. In the case of manned
aircraft, those allowed to fl y within
the TFR must be on a fl ight plan,
must communicate with air traffi c
control, and must “squawk” an assigned
transponder code. Everything else must
remain on the ground or outside of the
TFR.
In the case of unmanned aircraft,
there currently is no defi nitive way
to tell friend from foe, so the existing
procedure is to ground all unmanned
aircraft within the TFR, including model
aircraft. Anything else appearing in the
airspace is viewed as suspect.
Why such a large area? Current TFRs typically go out 30
nautical miles (34.5 statute miles) and encompass an area
of more than 3,700 square miles. In some instances, TFR
distances have been extended as far as 40 nautical miles.
I don’t know how 30 nautical miles was determined to be
the appropriate distance, and this is something AMA will
continue to question; however, the size of the TFR area is
relative to the reaction time/distance deemed necessary to
detect and intercept an intruder. The intent is to intercept
and neutralize an intruder as far away from the center as
possible.
Aviation safety is also a consideration in developing these
security measures, but not necessarily in the traditional
sense. If and when an intruder aircraft is detected within
the protected airspace, airborne assets are deployed. These
intercepting aircraft employ aggressive tactical operations
to counter the threat, and the airspace must be as clear
as possible to allow them to operate safely. That is why,
in addition to unmanned aircraft, other nonessential
aeronautical operations are also curtailed. As such, the
following paragraph appears in the Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) for these TFRs:
The following operations are not authorized within this TFR:
ight training, practice instrument approaches, aerobatic ight,
glider operations, seaplane operations, parachute operations,
ultralight, hang gliding, balloon operations, agriculture/crop
dusting, animal population control ight operations, banner
towing operations, sightseeing operations, maintenance test
ights, radio controlled model aircraft operations, model rocketry,
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and utility and pipeline
survey operations.
AMA believes there are alternative means available for
reaching the desired level of security without restricting
model aircraft operations. We are working with FAA’s
Special Operations Security division, along with the
National Aeronautic Association and the other sport aviation
groups, in an effort to obtain relief for our members and the
aero sport community in general.
Flying site assistance:
Information, case studies & more
AMA’s approach is to fi rst gain protection for our highprofi
le sanctioned events. If we are successful, we then want
to address waivers or exceptions for established (AMA)
fl ying sites, and ultimately to exempt model aviation from
the TFRs.
We were recently successful in clarifying the intent and
scope of the restrictions as they pertain to model aircraft.
Previously, the NOTAMs spoke to prohibiting “model
aircraft” operations within the TFR. It was unclear whether
this included Control Line and Free Flight activities.
It certainly seemed unlikely that CL and FF would
present the same concerns as RC models, so AMA sought
clarifi cation from the Special Operations Security Center.
Ultimately we were able to get this issue resolved and the
language in the NOTAMs changed. The language in recent
TFRs refers to “radio controlled model aircraft.” It’s a small
concession, but certainly a step in the right direction.
When it comes to the federal government, and especially
national security, the wheels turn slowly and this is proving
to be a long, painstaking process. I expect it will be some
time before we see any signifi cant relief, and we may not see
any real change until there is a change for the better in the
global political environment.
Clubs are fortunate to have a resource in Tony
Stillman, AMA’s national flying site assistance
coordinator. Helping 2,394 clubs with one of their most
critical issues—getting and keeping a flying site—is a
big task, and one that requires sizeable resources.
One of the biggest assets in Tony’s and your club’s
“toolkit” is the AMA’s website and its repository of howtos
and success stories, some of which entail working
with local municipal authorities.
Check out www.modelaircra
.org/membership/
clubs/fsap.aspx and you’ll nd a treasure trove of ideas
and problem-solving suggestions.
Tony is available with answers to nearly all of your
questions. Contact Tony at (912) 242-2407 or email him
at fsac@modelaircra
.org.
The Woodland/Davis Aeromodelers club has a flying
site success story that was recorded at AirVenture last
year. The video can be found at www.modelaircra
.org/
membership/site-story46.aspx.
Do you want to share a case study to help your fellow
pilots across the country? Send Tony your stories.
Consider compiling your story by problem, actions, and
results. Learn from your peers and help your peers. It’s
the best way to fly.
Edition: Model Aviation - 2012/08
Page Numbers: 16,17
Edition: Model Aviation - 2012/08
Page Numbers: 16,17
You have probably noticed that
the number and frequency of
Temporary Flight Restrictions
(TFRs) affecting model aircraft have
increased in the past several weeks. This
is not surprising
and unfortunately,
the occurrence of
TFRs is likely to
increase as we get
into the heart of the
2012 presidential
campaign.
Following
Mitt Romney’s
apparent clinching
of the Republican
nomination, Barak
Obama’s campaign
has shifted into high
gear and VIP TFRs
are increasing as he
travels across the
country.
Since January
2009, restrictions
on model aircraft
operations have been included as part of
the security measures imposed whenever
the president travels within the US.
They also come into play during highprofi
le events such as the recent 25th
NATO Summit held in Chicago, the
G-8 Summit Meeting at Camp David in
Maryland, and Super Bowl XLVI held in
Indianapolis.
We will also see similar TFRs for the
Republican
National
Convention
in Tampa,
Florida,
in August
and the
Democratic
National
Convention
in Charlotte,
North
Carolina, in
September.
Many
have asked
why radiocontrolled
model aircraft
operations
are included
in the
restrictions and prohibited while a VIP
TFR is in effect. Is it because model
airplanes are viewed as posing a threat to
our national security and the welfare of
our heads of state?
Certainly AMA doesn’t believe this,
and I don’t believe the FAA or the
Secret Service believes this, nor do any
of the many other federal, state, and
local agencies involved in developing and
implementing these security measures.
However, the recent advancements in
unmanned aircraft technology and the
advent of unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS) operations have signifi cantly
clouded the issue.
Many UAS platforms appear similar
to what we otherwise think of as model
aircraft and, without going into a lot of
detail, it’s easy to imagine an unmanned
aircraft designed to be harmful,
disruptive, or even lethal.
In a security zone, those monitoring
the airspace must be able to tell
friend from foe. In the case of manned
aircraft, those allowed to fl y within
the TFR must be on a fl ight plan,
must communicate with air traffi c
control, and must “squawk” an assigned
transponder code. Everything else must
remain on the ground or outside of the
TFR.
In the case of unmanned aircraft,
there currently is no defi nitive way
to tell friend from foe, so the existing
procedure is to ground all unmanned
aircraft within the TFR, including model
aircraft. Anything else appearing in the
airspace is viewed as suspect.
Why such a large area? Current TFRs typically go out 30
nautical miles (34.5 statute miles) and encompass an area
of more than 3,700 square miles. In some instances, TFR
distances have been extended as far as 40 nautical miles.
I don’t know how 30 nautical miles was determined to be
the appropriate distance, and this is something AMA will
continue to question; however, the size of the TFR area is
relative to the reaction time/distance deemed necessary to
detect and intercept an intruder. The intent is to intercept
and neutralize an intruder as far away from the center as
possible.
Aviation safety is also a consideration in developing these
security measures, but not necessarily in the traditional
sense. If and when an intruder aircraft is detected within
the protected airspace, airborne assets are deployed. These
intercepting aircraft employ aggressive tactical operations
to counter the threat, and the airspace must be as clear
as possible to allow them to operate safely. That is why,
in addition to unmanned aircraft, other nonessential
aeronautical operations are also curtailed. As such, the
following paragraph appears in the Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) for these TFRs:
The following operations are not authorized within this TFR:
ight training, practice instrument approaches, aerobatic ight,
glider operations, seaplane operations, parachute operations,
ultralight, hang gliding, balloon operations, agriculture/crop
dusting, animal population control ight operations, banner
towing operations, sightseeing operations, maintenance test
ights, radio controlled model aircraft operations, model rocketry,
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and utility and pipeline
survey operations.
AMA believes there are alternative means available for
reaching the desired level of security without restricting
model aircraft operations. We are working with FAA’s
Special Operations Security division, along with the
National Aeronautic Association and the other sport aviation
groups, in an effort to obtain relief for our members and the
aero sport community in general.
Flying site assistance:
Information, case studies & more
AMA’s approach is to fi rst gain protection for our highprofi
le sanctioned events. If we are successful, we then want
to address waivers or exceptions for established (AMA)
fl ying sites, and ultimately to exempt model aviation from
the TFRs.
We were recently successful in clarifying the intent and
scope of the restrictions as they pertain to model aircraft.
Previously, the NOTAMs spoke to prohibiting “model
aircraft” operations within the TFR. It was unclear whether
this included Control Line and Free Flight activities.
It certainly seemed unlikely that CL and FF would
present the same concerns as RC models, so AMA sought
clarifi cation from the Special Operations Security Center.
Ultimately we were able to get this issue resolved and the
language in the NOTAMs changed. The language in recent
TFRs refers to “radio controlled model aircraft.” It’s a small
concession, but certainly a step in the right direction.
When it comes to the federal government, and especially
national security, the wheels turn slowly and this is proving
to be a long, painstaking process. I expect it will be some
time before we see any signifi cant relief, and we may not see
any real change until there is a change for the better in the
global political environment.
Clubs are fortunate to have a resource in Tony
Stillman, AMA’s national flying site assistance
coordinator. Helping 2,394 clubs with one of their most
critical issues—getting and keeping a flying site—is a
big task, and one that requires sizeable resources.
One of the biggest assets in Tony’s and your club’s
“toolkit” is the AMA’s website and its repository of howtos
and success stories, some of which entail working
with local municipal authorities.
Check out www.modelaircra
.org/membership/
clubs/fsap.aspx and you’ll nd a treasure trove of ideas
and problem-solving suggestions.
Tony is available with answers to nearly all of your
questions. Contact Tony at (912) 242-2407 or email him
at fsac@modelaircra
.org.
The Woodland/Davis Aeromodelers club has a flying
site success story that was recorded at AirVenture last
year. The video can be found at www.modelaircra
.org/
membership/site-story46.aspx.
Do you want to share a case study to help your fellow
pilots across the country? Send Tony your stories.
Consider compiling your story by problem, actions, and
results. Learn from your peers and help your peers. It’s
the best way to fly.